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Abstract: This study aims to examine the impact of earnings management and 
stock return. The magnitude of accruals and operating cash flows are the 
important feature that we add to this study. This feature gives deeper analysis 
of how earnings management affects stock return. We use Indonesian data 
from 2011 to 2013 as our sample. Three earnings management models are 
applied for this research: (1) Jones, (2) Modified Jones and (3) Kaznik model. 
We find that discretionary accruals cannot explain stock return, but after 
considering the magnitude of accruals and operating cash flow the result is 
different. Discretionary accruals affect stock return positively, only when 
accruals are higher than operating cash flow. These findings contribute to 
earnings management and market-based accounting researches. 
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1 Introduction 
This study investigates the impact of earnings management to stock return. Previous 
studies about earnings management have been conducted, such as Jones (1991), Dechow 
et al. (1995), and Kaznik (1999) and a many more. This study develops those researches 
by examining the relationship between earnings management and stock return and also 
adds an important feature to those relationship by considering the magnitude of accruals 
and operating cash flow. 
Relevance is one of the primary qualitative characteristics of financial reporting that 
usually represented by earnings response coefficient (ERC). Manager as a preparer of 
financial statement, uses estimation, judgments and certain level of discretion in 
presenting earnings figure that suit to their objectives, for example: dividend policy is 
one of management’s motivations to present targeted earnings level (Daniel et al., 2008), 
meet or beat analysts’ expectation to gain positive reaction from the market (Bartov  
et al., 2002). Other motivation to report earnings is to attain earnings threshold 
(Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; DeGeorge, 1999). 
Managers may use earnings management as a strategy to attract investors and 
potential investors. In examining the relationship between earnings management and 
investors’ reaction, our study refers to positive accounting theory. The theory assumes 
that managers use accounting policy and certain level of discretion to achieve targeted 
earnings level. In this study, we examine management’s motivation to meet targeted 
earnings level to make firm’s stock become investors’ choice. In order to realise it, 
managers use earnings management strategy, so that reported earnings can convince 
market participant about firms’ value. This, in turn stimulates positive investors’ 
reaction, such as higher stock price, higher return, lower risk and higher return for each 
unit risk. In summary, it can be concluded that managers use earnings management 
strategy to make firms’ shares become investors’ choice when they develop their 
portfolio strategy. 
This study contributes to earnings management and market reaction research, because 
we consider the important aspect of earnings components, which are the proportion of 
accruals relative to operating cash flow. For firms whose accruals higher than operating 
cash flow, we believe that these firms use earnings management strategy using accrual 
component to boost their earnings. This strategy seems work, because investors fixate to 
earnings information and they fail to differentiate the quality of earnings components 
(Sloan, 1996). 
Our article is presented as follow. The second section discusses hypothesis 
development. The third section presents research methodology, including earnings 
management models used in this study. The fourth section analyses the results. The last 
section concludes. 
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2 Hypothesis development 
Accruals and operating cash flow are two components that develop earnings. Moreover 
there are two accounting principles that affect earnings, there are revenue recognition and 
matching principles. Based on those principles, accruals are considered have a capability 
to mitigate timing and matching problems that is inherent in cash flow so that earnings 
are believed more related to future performance (Dechow, 1994). 
Healy (1985) believes that managers perform earnings management through accruals. 
Accruals consist of discretionary and non-discretionary components. Discretionary 
accruals are accruals in which managers have the ability to exercise some control (Scott, 
2015). In this case, it seems that using accruals stimulate another problem, since accruals 
give managers some discretion of using policy, judgment and estimation in reporting 
earnings. These conditions stimulate managers to execute earnings management through 
discretionary accruals since it is hard to detect (Scott, 2015). For the reason that accrual 
earnings management is hard to reveal, many studies use different methodology to find 
out how much earnings management conducted by the firms, such as Jones Model 
(Jones, 1991), Modified Jones Model (Dechow et al., 1995), Kaznik Model (Kaznik, 
1999) and many more. 
The motivation of earnings management are ranging from either opportunistically 
manipulating earnings or signalling private information to capital market (Dechow, 
1994). Even though the intention behind earnings management is hard to determined, but 
vast majority of earnings management researches focus on opportunistic motivation to 
engage in earnings management (Cruz and Luiz, 2015). In relation to capital market 
reactions, earnings management is a strategy used by managers to get positive reaction 
from the market. Earnings is very important information, so investors are fixated by 
earnings information (Sloan, 1996). Market participants positively (negatively) react 
when top managements announce reported earnings that can (cannot) meet or beat market 
expectation (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Bartov et al., 2002). 
Given the increasing attention to earnings (as a product of accounting process), 
managers are stimulated to report an aggressive earnings to meet investors expectation 
(Chan et al., 2006). Subramanyam (1996) and Beaver and Engel (1996) also discuss the 
relationship between earnings management and stock return. They find positive reaction 
between earnings management and stock return. These results are consistent with 
Beneish and Vargus (2002), in which they observe that income-increasing accruals 
leading to positive market reaction in the short run. Supporting those ideas, we present 
our hypothesis as follow. 
H1: Earnings management affects stock return. 
Expanding those ideas, many studies give evidence that the ability of earnings 
management to predict stock return produce mixed evidence (Cruz and Luiz, 2015). It 
seems that managers have to consider other factors when they decide to use earnings 
management strategy to increase stock return, because it does not apply in all situations. 
Ching et al., (2006) present evidence that stock market is not fooled by the use of 
discretionary accruals to manage earnings. The study of Baber et al. (2006) reveal that 
market participants are aware of the incentives of mangers to manage reported earnings, 
and they adjust for the earnings management when they provided with the information to 
do so. Arni and Sulistiawan (2015) provide findings that income-increasing strategies 
generally stimulate negative effect to stock valuation, but, specifically, an income 
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increasing strategy using account receivable generates positive impact to stock valuation. 
Their findings imply that different methods of earnings management generate different 
impacts to investors’ behaviour. 
Earnings component expresses more detail information than earnings information 
only. Bowen et al. (1987) break earnings into accrual and cash (or funds) flow 
components. They show that innovations in both components are statistically significant 
related to the abnormal stock returns of reporting firms (Lalepour, 2013). DuCharme and 
Malatesta (2004) provide evidence that normal accruals contain more information than 
just earnings information. Earnings quality can be expanded by reporting earnings 
components; which are operating cash flow and accruals. Operating cash flow results 
from continuing operation, they are less likely to reverse and are less subject to error and 
bias (Sloan, 1996). It can be concluded that earnings that are contained more operating 
cash flow than accruals are more persistent, and so, they have better earnings quality.  
Earnings increases triggered by higher accruals indicate lower earnings persistence, 
which leads to lower earnings quality. Earnings quality concerns with the financial health 
and the capability of informed earnings and it redirects the company’s exact earnings to 
predict future earnings (Piyawiboon, 2015). That is why earnings quality is expected to 
reduce mispricing. Firms that show a higher value of earnings quality measure are 
expected to be less mispriced on average (Pierotti and Wagenhofer, 2014). Firms with 
higher accruals comparing to their operating cash flow in earnings are indicated to 
perform earnings management. In this case, actually, operating cash flow has better 
capability to predict future profitability rather than accruals. Since earnings quality is 
low, stock price are usually mispriced and managers can use earnings management as a 
strategy to gain positive reaction from market participants. This argument is supported by 
Collins and Hribar (2000). They find out that market tends to overestimate the 
persistence of accrual component, so they tend to overprice accruals in the current year. 
Using the idea of the magnitude of earnings components, we expect positive relation 
between earnings management to market performance. Our second hypothesis is 
presented as follow. 
H2: Earnings management positively affects stock returns for firms whose earnings 
contains more accruals than operating cash flow.  
3 Data and methodology 
This research analyses Indonesian Listed Company from 2011 to 2013, except for 
banking and financial institutions industries. Our financial data are collected from 
Indonesia Stock Exchange, while market data are obtained from Yahoo Finance. 
Indonesian stock market has lower accounting quality (Fan and Wong, 2002) comparing 
to several stock markets in other South-East Asian countries. By analysing the 
phenomenon, this study contributes to earnings management studies in developing 
countries. This is the contextual aspect of this study. If earnings information has low 
impact to investors, then earnings managements also produce low stimulation to the 
market. 
Excess return (EXRETt) is used to represent stock return, and we use market-adjusted 
return. This excess return is calculated as the difference between stock return and market 
return.  
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Earnings management is represented by discretionary accruals. Discretionary accruals 
(DACC) are the residual value of total accruals (TACC) minus non-discretionary 
accruals (NDAC). 
Total Accruals (TACC) are calculated by subtracting operating cash flow from 
earnings (TACC = EARN – OCF). These are three models that are selected to decompose 
total accruals into non-discretionary and discretionary accruals: 
1 Jones Model (Jones, 1991) 
 TACCit = α0 + α1 ΔREVit + α2 PPEit + eit 
2 Modified Jones (Dechow et al., 1995) 
 TACC for Modified Jones is the same with Jones Model (Jones, 1991), unless 
NDAC as the fitted value of TACC models are modified by: 
 NDACit = α0 + α1 [ΔREVit – ΔRECit] + α2 PPEit + eit 
3 Kaznik Model (Kaznik, 1999) 
 TACCit = α0 + α1 ΔREVit + α2 PPEit + α3OCFit + eit 
 where:  
 TACC = total accruals (EARNt – OCFt) 
 ΔREV = change in revenue from year t–1 to year t (REVt – REVt–1)  
 ΔREC = change in receivable from year t–1 to year t (RECt – RECt–1) 
 PPE = gross property, plant, and equipment in year t 
 OCF = operating cash flow from statement of cash flow. 
All variables are scaled by beginning total assets. 
Nondiscretionary accruals (NDAC) are fitted value from above models and 
discretionary accruals (DAC) are defined as the residuals. DECt is a dummy variable that 
represent the magnitude of accrual relative to operating cash flow. DECt is 1 (0) when 
total accrual is higher (lower) than operating cash flow. The Model is presented below: 
EXRETt = 0 + 1 DECt + 2 DACCt + 3 DECt*DACCt+ 4 LN_TAi,t–1 
                 + 5 OCFt +1 DUM_YEARt +Ɛt 
where: 
EXRETt = Excess Return in year t. 
DECt = Dummy variable that equals one (zero) for firms with total accruals higher 
(lower) than operating cash flow in year t. 
DACCt = (Jones/Dechow/Kaznik): Discretionary Accruals in year t using Jones/Dechow/ 
Kaznik model. 
LNTAt-1 = Natural logarithm of total assets in year t–1. 
OCFt = Operating cash flow in year t 
DUM_YEARt = dummy year. 
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4 Results and discussion 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics. We use firms listed in Indonesia Stock Exchage 
and based on data availability, there are 719 firms year used in this study. Table 1 present 
descriptive data. Those are minimums, maximums, means and standard deviations of 
each variable used in our research. TACCt (Total Accruals in year t scaled by beginning 
total asset) yields a range from –72.462 to 11.23. OCFt and LNTAt-1 also presented in the 
same way. 
Discretionary accruals (DACCt) are composed using three models of earnings 
management. The mean value for DACCt based on Jones, Modified Jones and Kaznik 
Models are 0.1872, 0.173 and 0.02 respectively. DECt is the important feature that is 
added to this study. We add DECt as moderating variable to examine its ability to affect 
the relation between DACCt and EXRETt. 
Table 1 indicates that in average, EXRETt produce positive return. Excess return of 
firms in year t presents a range from –0.941 to 10.229 with the mean is 0.227. Those data 
are pooled data from 2011 to 2013.  
We predict that earnings management is one of important factors that lead to positive 
return. In order to make firms’ stocks become investors’ choice, managers boost earnings 
through earnings management. However, in our study, by using LNTAt-1 and OCFt as 
controlling variable, the results present that earnings management does not affect stock 
return. The results are not tabulated. So, H1 is not supported.  
Table 1 Descriptive statistics 
Variable N Minimum Maximum Mean SD 
TACCt 719 –72.462 11.236 –0.136 3.066 
OCFt 719 –3.558 97.992 0.318 4.544 
LNTAt-1 719 21.927 32.837 27.868 1.699 
DACCt (Jones) 719 –72.192 173.187 0.187 7.017 
DACCt (Modified Jones) 719 –72.219 173.187 0.173 7.076 
DACCt (Kaznik) 719 –2.331 2.194 0.020 0.221 
DECt  719 0 1 0.308 0.462 
DECt * DACCt (Jones) 719 –3.061 7.614 0.053 0.448 
DECt * DACCt (Modified Jones) 719 –0.192 118.828 0.289 4.669 
DECt * DACCt (Kaznik) 719 –4.43 119.501 0.214 4.750 
EXRETt 719 –0.941 10.229 0.227 0.902 
Notes: Variable definitions: TACCt: Total accruals in year t scaled by beginning total 
assets. OCFt: Operating cash flow in year t. LNTAt-1: Natural logarithm of total 
assets in year t-1. DACCt (Jones/Dechow/Kaznik): Discretionary Accruals in year t 
using Jones/Modified Jones/Kaznik model. DECt: Dummy variable that equals one 
(zero) for firms with total accrual higher (lower) than operating cash flow in year t. 
EXRETt:Stock return in year t after adjusted by market return in year t. 
Table 2 shows the results of our tests. Earnings management affects stock return when 
earnings component is dominated by accruals. Discretionary accruals generate higher 
return for companies that have higher accruals than its operating cash flow. The 
coefficient of DECt * DACCt is positive and statistically significant at 1%. All of those 
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earnings management models tend to produce similar interpretation. By using Jones 
Model, DECt * DACCt produce positive t-value (4.895). For Modified Jones and Kaznik 
models, t-value are 6.191 and 6.576 respectively. In this article, we present the robust 
results. Three models of earnings management stimulate market performance. Therefore, 
H2 is supported. 
Table 2 Earnings management to stock return 
n=719 
Jones Model Modified Jones Model Kaznik Model 
Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t 
Constant 1.291 2.307** 1.034 1.853* 1.147 2.071** 
DECt  –0.038 –0.522 –0.012 –0.161 0.021 0.296 
DACCt –0.001 –0.205 –0.001 –0.194 –0.308 –1.974** 
DECt * DACCt 0.370 4.895*** 0.044 6.191*** 0.047 6.576*** 
LNTAt-1 –0.040 –2.035** –0.031 –1.596* –0.035 –1.792** 
OCFt –0.006 –0.739 –0.006 –0.737 –0.007 –0.906 
Year 2011 0.041 0.497 0.057 0.701 0.034 0.419 
Year 2012 0.103 1.243 0.120 1.468 0.101 1.246 
F 4.514 6.612 7.326 
Adjusted R2  0.033 0.052 0.058 
Notes: Variable definitions: TACCt: Total accruals in year t scaled by beginning total 
assets. OCFt: Operating cash flow in year t. LNTAt-1: Natural logarithm of total 
assets in year t-1. DACCt (Jones/Dechow/ Kaznik): Discretionary Accruals in 
year t using Jones/Modified Jones/Kaznik model. DECt: Dummy variable that 
equals one (zero) for firms with total accrual higher (lower) than operating cash 
flow in year t. EXRETt:Stock return in year t after adjusted by market return in 
year t. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
Our results imply that the magnitude of earnings components is a moderating effect to 
explain the relation between earnings management and market performance. For firms 
with total accrual higher than operating cash flow, earnings management is an important 
strategy to boost stock return. Based on the basic value relevance studies, in average, 
good news produces positive reaction. Further analysis is conducted by splitting sample 
based on their profitability because the majority of the studies used profitability as a key 
dimension of firm performance (Sajilan et al., 2015). By assuming earnings expectation 
of investors is zero, we split our sample based on positive and negative net income 
(Table 3).  
Based on Table 3, we discover that earnings management for firms with higher 
accruals than operating cash flow affects stock return when companies present positive 
earnings (Table 3 Panel A). Conversely, in negative earnings firms, stock return is not 
explained by DACCt, DECt, and DACCt * DECt (Table 3 Panel B). These results are 
examined by using three models of earnings management stated above. The results are 
robust across the models. From the result of Table 3, it is shown that stock return cannot 
be explained by merely discretionary accruals or operating cash flow alone. In other 
words, accrual earnings management strategy to increase stock return does not apply to 
all condition. However, the proportion from those two earnings components has the 
ability to affect stock return (in this case higher proportion of accruals relative to 
   
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
   54 F.A. Rudiawarni, D. Sulistiawan and Y.K. Feliana    
 
    
 
 
   
   
 
   
   
 
   
       
 
operating cash flow). This result is consistent with Collins and Hribar (2000) which also 
find that market tends to overestimate the persistence of accrual component, so they tend 
to overprice accruals in the current year. 
Table 3 Earnings management to excess return for profit and loss firms 
 Jones Model Modified Jones Model Kaznik Model 
 Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t 
Panel A: Profit Firms (Positive Net Income) 
Constant 1.201 2.046** 1.071 1.834* 1.148 1.985** 
DECit –0.017 –0.231 0.034 0.464 0.091 1.224 
DAit –0.001 –0.223 –0.001 –0.205 –0.531 –2.465 
DECit * DAit 0.514 5.804*** 0.046 6.579*** 0.052 7.291*** 
SIZEit-1 –0.035 –1.717** –0.031 –1.511* –0.033 –1.639** 
OCFit –0.007 –0.922 –0.007 –0.917 –0.009 –1.241 
Year2011 0.003 0.032 0.011 0.135 –0.013 –0.151 
Year 2012 0.051 0.608 0.061 0.732 0.041 0.505 
F   5.915  7.327  8.81 
Adjusted R2  0.53  0.67  0.082 
Panel B: Loss Firms (Negative Net Income) 
Constant 4.01 1.952* 3.425 1.706* 4.036 1.954* 
DECit –0.283 –0.68 –0.269 –0.991 –0.235 –0.814 
DAit –0.001 –0.223 0.05 0.255 –0.146 –0.497 
DECit * DAit 0.477 1.04 0.074 1.017 0.062 1.018 
SIZEit-1 –0.147 –1.968** –0.13 –1.767** –0.151 –1.984** 
OCFit 0.161 0.375 0.515 0.829 0.51 0.712 
Year2011 0.148 0.533 0.263 0.959 0.191 0.708 
Year 2012 0.275 0.921 0.404 1.343 0.338 1.154 
F   1.039  1.032  1.027 
Adjusted R2  0.003  0.071  0.002 
Notes: Variable definitions: TACCt: Total accruals in year t scaled by beginning total 
assets. OCFt: Operating cash flow in year t. LNTAt-1: Natural logarithm of total 
assets in year t-1. DACCt (Jones/Dechow/ Kaznik): Discretionary Accruals in 
year t using Jones/Modified Jones/Kaznik model. DECt: Dummy variable that 
equals one (zero) for firms with total accrual higher (lower) than operating cash 
flow in year t. EXRETt:Stock return in year t after adjusted by market return in 
year t. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
SIZE as a controlling variable negatively affect stock return. It shows that the larger the 
size of the firm, the smaller excess return will be. Analysts are focus more to larger firms, 
so information from larger firms are relatively more observable and reflected in stock 
price than those from smaller firms. With the same information content, information 
from smaller firms will bring higher impact to the market rather than information that 
comes from larger firms. 
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Our results show that market participants employ discretionary accruals data to 
evaluate market performance when (1) the gap between net income and operating cash 
flow is higher, and (2) firms produce profit. Bad economic condition decreases earnings 
relevancy (Swanson, et al., 2003); it means that accruals become less reliable (Bernard 
and Stober, 1989).  
5 Conclusion 
Our article has reexamined researches concerning the impact of earnings components to 
market performance. We present evidence that discretionary accruals are not an 
important factor to boost stock price. After adding an important feature, this study reports 
unique findings. Discretionary accruals are the important factor to improve stock return 
when earnings are dominated by accruals than operating cash flow. The higher accrual 
means that the gap between net income and operating cash flow is higher. For profit 
firms, accrual items that can be affected by management policies produce higher return. 
Our findings give benefit to earnings management studies. Contextual aspect of the 
relation between earnings management and stock return is explained by our data. Using 
additional feature, the magnitude of accruals relative to cash flow, as an important part of 
our study, we present that earnings management in firms with dominant operating cash 
flow is not important for investors, especially when firm produce loss. Conversely, for 
firms that produce profit and dominant accruals relative to cash flow, this study suggests 
that those firms may improve shareholders’ wealth by using discretionary accruals.  
Some caveats apply to this article that can be an avenue for future studies. First, we 
only consider return in current period. For future researches, return can be extended to 
future return, considering there is accrual reverse in earnings management. Second, this 
study only considers return that is affected by earnings management strategy, in which 
for the next studies, it can be examined risk based return as its dependent variable. Risk 
based return may influence the choice of investors for their portfolio strategy. The third, 
using the idea of Lin et al. (2015), future researches can be developed by using R&D 
expenditure, financing policy and default risk as important variables. The last, this article 
does not consider the adoption of IFRS as discussed in Kouki (2015). The use of IFRS 
implementation as an important moderating variable may produce more valuable 
findings. 
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